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In the late summer of 1938, Japan’s leading newspaper, the Asahi Shinbun, promulgated the
release of a new book called Mugi to Heitai (Barley and Soldiers). The page-width advertisement
read, “A record of blood and gunpowder smoke born from the midst of actual battle!”1) Similar
advertisements ﬂooded Japan’s news media and Mugi to Heitai soon sold over a million copies.
The work would be the most famous to emerge from the conﬂict in China with its author, Hino
Ashihei, becoming the war’s representative soldier writer.2) But then came military defeat; Japan
surrendered, the Occupation began, and in the wake of war that made his career, Hino was
purged. As is well known, postwar tribunals held throughout the Paciﬁc spent years wallowing
through political mineﬁelds, judicial farces, and unprecedented legal ground in determining the
nature and the extent of Japanese wartime atrocities. Scholars have long studied these trials,
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In January 1946, under the American Occupation of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP) initiated a purge of Japanese militarists and ultranationalists. Distinct
from the war crime trials, the purge was a uniquely ambitious program designed to limit the
inﬂuence of wartime leaders and opinion makers in the postwar years. This paper examines
the nature of the purge program, placing particular emphasis on the Public Information Media
purge. By tracing the evolution of SCAP directives, it argues that Occupation authorities
undermined their goal of creating a non-punitive and collectively-administered purge by
turning it into a semi-judicial process in which individuals were targeted based on the
weighing of evidence. This paper then looks to the experience of Public Information Media
purgees—focusing in particular on soldier writer Hino Ashihei—and contends that the
designation of writers was an ultimately subjective process that led to considerable confusion.
While historians generally view the purge as having been a success, this paper takes a step in
the opposite direction by suggesting that inherent contradictions in purge policy, along with its
haphazard application, contributed in part to a muddled understanding of who was
responsible for Japanese militarism and why they were or were not held accountable.
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focusing in particular on the Tokyo War Crime Tribunal. What has received far less attention is
the purge: an American-designed operation that attempted to quickly and efﬁciently remove the
inﬂuence of wartime leadership.3) The Americans, speciﬁcally the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (SCAP), believed that to build a new postwar democratic Japan they had to ﬁrst
destroy militarism in all its forms.4) The purge was their chosen method Yet, while Japan
emerged from the Occupation as a demilitarized and stable democracy, purge policy left the
nation with unanswered questions of wartime responsibility and accountability. This
unintended result is particularly evident in the design and administration of the Public
Information Media purge of wartime writers.
The purge—in particular the Public Information Media purge—has received little scholarly
attention. There are several notable exceptions including an unpublished manuscript by John D
Montgomery (1953), a frequently-quoted work by Hans Beaerwald (1959), and a more recent
Japanese-language volume by Masuda Yorishi (1998), but these works are policy studies that
fail to consider the experience of being purged. Conversely, while literary studies of purged
writers such as Hino Ashihei are numerous, none attempt to critically examine the policies that
led to their purged status.5) The following aims to span the gap between policy history and
literary history to more effectively grapple with questions of wartime accountability. It begins
with policy.
The Japanese purge is unique in the history of wartime accountability on two levels. First,
SCAP intended it to be non-punitive. Unlike the war crime trials or even German Denaziﬁcation,
questions of guilt, responsibility, and accountability were not part of its initial design. Second,
the Americans decided to implement the purge administratively, not judicially. It had no due
process, no hearings or testimonials, and only limited possibility for appeal. This too was
distinct from the war crime trials, for the purge was not concerned with what individual
Japanese did or did not do during the war. Rather, SCAP created a purge that would collectively
remove all members of a designated rank or group from positions of public inﬂuence,
prohibiting them not only from holding posts that they occupied during the war, but also
preventing them from accepting any public or quasi-public position after the war.6)
SCAP issued their initial purge directive on January 4, 1946. Appealing ﬁrst to the Potsdam
Declaration, the directive instructed that seven categories of Japanese be removed and excluded
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from public ofﬁce. They were:
A. War Criminals
B. Career and Special Service Military Personnel; Special Police Ofﬁcials; Ofﬁcials of War
Ministries
C. Inﬂuential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic, or Secret Patriotic Societies
D. Persons Inﬂuential in Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance
Political Society, etc.
E. Ofﬁcers of Financial and Business Concerns Involved in Japanese Expansion
F. Governors of Occupied Territory
G. Other Militarists and Ultranationalists7)
The directive deﬁned each of the categories, but SCAP charged the Japanese government with
interpretation and administration. The Japanese, however, were not permitted to alter the
fundamental structure of the purge. When the Shidehara Cabinet received the initial directive,
the members announced they would resign unless the Americans retracted the order. Douglas
MacArthur responded by saying that if the Cabinet resigned, “Thereafter Baron Shidehara may
be acceptable to the Emperor for reappointment as prime minister, but he will not be acceptable
to me.”8) This temporarily tamed the Cabinet, but a few weeks later they again tried to limit the
purge by making it individualized rather than collective. MacArthur again prevented their
move.9) He and the General Headquarters (GHQ) believed that only through a collective
categorical purge could favoritism and corruption be minimized while maximizing time and
resource efﬁciency.10) Nevertheless, while the ideal of a non-punitive and collectively applied
purge would remain, reality soon differed.
It was a new ordinance, released in January 1947, that began to undermine the original
character of the purge. Expanding the earlier directive, it supplemented “public ofﬁce” with
“public service,” a term that included in its deﬁnition writers, journalists, and other media
personnel.11) They would be purged under the catchall “Other Militarists and Ultranationalists”
category (Category G), which was designed to snare any undesirables who had evaded the other
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groups. The ﬁrst interpretation of the category came in March when the Japanese government
established ﬁve criteria for purging writers, artists, scholars, journalists, and other media
personnel.12) They were:
1. Person[s] who advocated aggression of militant nationalism, or actively contributed to
such propaganda, or who through his political or philosophic doctrine laid down an
ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East
Asia or policies of similar nature, or the Manchurian Incident, China Incident or the
Paciﬁc War.
2. Person[s] who advocated dictatorship or totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern.
3. Person[s] who advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other
nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda to the above effect.
4. Person[s] who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or
anti-militaristic ideologies.
5. Person[s] who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultra-
nationalism.13)
The belief was that those in media still had the power to “subvert the aims of the Occupation
and mold the minds of the people for new wars of aggression.”14) The challenge faced by SCAP
was that collective categories based on military rank or public ofﬁce were useless when it came
to purging writers, publishers, ﬁlm producers, and their like. To target media personnel, SCAP
needed a policy that would extend into the private sector and remove those individuals who
continued to “exercise power and inﬂuence behind the scenes.”15) The solution, initiated in the
spring of 1947, was to create a Public Information Media purge that would rely on a new system
of provisional designation. Under the original system a simple questionnaire—essentially a
background check—led to a self-incriminating purge; the new provisional designation system
placed initiating power with investigation committees that targeted persons based on gathered
evidence.16) Once a provisional designee, an individual had thirty days to submit an appeal to
the committee. If the person did not submit an appeal, or if the appeal was rejected, their
designation shifted to an ofﬁcial purge status.17)
Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies    University of Tsukuba Volume 5 / March 2013
4
12) To prevent a potentially chaotic situation and stop designated persons from holding or contending for
ofﬁce, general elections were postponed until after administration of the purge began. The Japanese
government issued their purge criteria on March 10, 1946 and elections were held on April 10, 1946.
“Removal of Ultranationalists: The Political Phase,” PRJ vol. 1, 23.
13) “Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, Appendix I,” PRJ vol. 2, 518.
14) Kenneth Dyke memorandum to the Chief of Staff (May 17, 1946), quoted in “Removal of Ultranationalists:
The Public Information Media Phase,” PRJ vol. 1, 59.
15) “Removal of Ultranationalists: The Political Phase,” PRJ vol. 1, 42.
16) Baerwald, 51.
17) Ibid., 43.
The Japanese government established an Information Media Investigation Committee of six
scholars who were charged with composing a blacklist of media organizations. In the process
they also reviewed over 60,000 books published between 1937 and 1941—the years SCAP
deemed critical to the growth of Japanese militarism—collecting evidence against several
hundred individual writers.18) Based on their ﬁndings, they provisionally designated 331 writers,
of whom 285 were ofﬁcially purged.19) The committee took precautions in designating purgees,
only targeting writers whose books survived the war. Nevertheless, the process was
fundamentally subjective with many of the writers designated solely on the knowledge and
experiences of the purge committee.20) The case of Hino Ashihei (1907–1960) illustrates just how
subjective the process could be.
Hino made his name as a writer by winning the coveted Akutagawa Prize in 1937. Already in
the Japanese army, the award earned him a quick promotion to the Army Information Corps
(Gunh-od-obu).21) Hino based his next novel, Mugi to Heitai (Barley and Soldiers) on his early
experiences as a soldier on the China front. Stressing the accuracy of the book’s content, he even
claimed that it could have been entitled Waga Senki, or “my record of war.”22) Advertisers
promoted the realism and sincerity of Mugi to Heitai and in a matter of weeks the success of the
novel turned Hino into a national celebrity.23) Tsutomu Narasaki, writing in 1943, described the
book’s effect with the following:
This novel radiates an irresistible force, not only because in it the actual battle is described
by a soldier ﬁghting right on the spot, but because it is the work of a poet. The appearance
of [Mugi to Heitai] created such enthusiasm that the war accounts or novels, which were
more like studies, paled in comparison and almost disappeared. At the same time this work
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proved the social signiﬁcance of a novel, namely the power of a book to penetrate the social
masses. This one work has convincingly conﬁrmed the fact that an outstanding work of
ﬁction can move the hearts of an entire nation.24)
Hino followed the success of Mugi to Heitai with Tsuchi to Heitai (Mud and Soldiers; 1938) and
Hana to Heitai (Flowers and Soldiers; 1939). All three works are autobiographical, with each
focusing on the everyday experiences of the rank and ﬁle of Japan’s Imperial Army. Troop
movement and overall battle strategy are mentioned only in passing and justiﬁcation for Japan’s
presence in China is never discussed. Ideologically, Hino’s writing is similarly vague. Although
at times sentimentally patriotic, the texts are too melancholy to be considered propagative. In
fact, prior to the war’s end, Mugi to Heitai was translated into at least twenty languages—
including Chinese, Czech, Burmese, French, German, Italian, Korean, Manchurian, Mongolian,
Russian, Spanish, and multiple English translations—with most Western critics praising the
book as an Eastern counterpart to Erich Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front.25)
Back on the home front, Hino’s soldier trilogy triggered a media craze known as the “soldier
boom” (heitai b -umu), a label derived from the titles of the involved works. These included the
most ambitious Japanese ﬁlm production of the day, Tsuchi to Heitai (Mud and Soldiers); well
over a dozen military songs, such as Tabako to Heitai (Tobacco and Soldiers), Ume to Heitai
(Plum Blossoms and Soldiers), and Fukuchan to Heitai ([cartoon character] Fuku-chan and
Soldiers); advertising campaigns for goods such as Kanzume to Heitai (Canned Items and
Soldier); and copycat books with titles like God-o S-oshir-o’s Uma to Heitai (Horses and Soldiers)
and Sh-oji Takeo’s Kagaku to Heitai (Science and Soldiers). As an author, Hino continued to write
proliﬁcally for most of the war. His focus remained on the experiences of the common soldier
and his reputation as the quintessential soldier writer endured throughout the conﬂict in China,
the war for the Paciﬁc, and ﬁnally in the struggle to defend the home islands.
With the end of the war Hino was convinced that his days were numbered. He believed, along
with many in Japan, that the Allied forces would soon arrest and execute everyone of inﬂuence.
To prolong his life he ﬂed to his mother’s hometown where he wrote what he thought would be
his ﬁnal essay, “Kanashiki Heitai” (Unhappy Soldiers).26) The work, appearing in the Asahi
Shimbun less than a month after Japan’s surrender, is an empathetic tribute to the same
Japanese soldiers who were the focus of his wartime writing. In Mugi to Heitai Hino praised the
spirit of the common soldier as that which went beyond “the mediocre feelings and thoughts of
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ordinary people.”27) In “Kanashiki Heitai” he appeals to this same spirit, writing that Japan
surrendered in spite of the moral supremacy of the Japanese soldier: “my heart’s belief in the
greatness of the Japanese soldier remains unchanged … I have thought for a long time that all
Japanese must look up to their soldiers, and that those soldiers who lay in eternal rest should be
the living and spiritual foundation of the Japanese people.”28) Only ﬁve days after the
appearance of “Kanashiki Heitai,” SCAP issued a stringent and clearly deﬁned 10-point “Press
Code” that they applied to all publishing industries.29) Had Hino waited a few more days to voice
his mind, his “ﬁnal testament” would have never reached the public. But it did, and in doing so
conﬁrmed his wartime reputation as the voice of the common soldier.
It was not until May 1948 that Hino discovered his name among a list of provisional purge
designees. He appealed his status within the allotted thirty days claiming that if his work
warranted the purge, then all writers of the Army Information Corps should suffer the same
fate.30) The purge committee responded by acknowledging that his writing had a humanistic
bearing but nevertheless concluding that some of his work stressed the supremacy of the
Japanese people, endorsed the war, and exalted a ﬁghting spirit. In short, as a writer with far-
reaching inﬂuence he had supported militarism and cooperated in its propagation.31) The
committee’s explanation speciﬁed four works, Heitai no Uta (Soldiers’ Song), Teki Sh -ogun
(Enemy General), Rikugun (Army), and Heitai no Chizu (Soldiers’ Map). What distinguishes the
works from Hino’s better-known wartime writing is that all four describe the battle for Bataan
with the United States as the prime enemy. As to be expected, the stories offer one-sided half-
truthful accounts of the Philippines Campaign. That said, they include little to warrant censure
from a society that values free speech. At no point does Hino go beyond the cultural climate of
wartime Japan to incite hate crimes or propagate violence in a way that would resemble the
likes of Germany’s infamous wartime publisher Julius Streicher. In fact, one of the
characteristics of Hino’s writing is that he is less concerned with demonizing the American
enemy than he is with presenting an idealized image of the Japanese soldier, exaggerating his
qualities and patriotic zeal. Hino wrote the children’s book Heitai no Uta (Soldier’s Song), for
example, to help young Japanese understand that their nation’s soldiers were not only strong
and brave, but that they also possessed a beautiful spirit.32) Similarly, in Teki Sh -ogun (Enemy
General) he whitewashes the experience of Bataan in such a way as to make the reader believe
that it was the Japanese soldiers who saved the defeated Allies from starvation by providing
Japanese Soldier Writers and the American Postwar Purge of Militarists and Ultranationalists William R. Stevenson III
7
27) Hino, Barley and Soldiers, 184.
28) Hino Ashihei, “Kanashiki Heitai,” Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper), September, 1945.  also in Ikeda
Hiroshi, 31.
29) SCAPIN 33, September 19, 1945. Ibid., 12.
30) “List of Persons Submitted Counter-Evidences Against the Provisional Designation As Writer,” U.S.
National Archives; Shimane Kiyoshi, “Tsuih -o Sareta Hitobito no Iibun,” Shis -o no Kagaku no. 53
(August 1966): 37.
31) Imamura, 100.
32) Hino Ashihei, Heitai no Uta (1943), excerpted in Ikeda, 48.
them with food and provisions.
The primary purpose of the aforementioned “Press Code” was to prevent criticism of either
SCAP or the United States. Although relatively lenient in its application, works that referred to
Americans as the enemy were consistently censored, a hypocritical policy that Jay Rubin and
others argue had the potential “to compromise the effectiveness of the Occupation reforms.”33) If
the policy had been applied retroactively, as it was in an indirect way with the purge, it alone
would have justiﬁed a censorship of Hino’s work. That said, Hino wrote his wartime books
under a far more restrictive set of guidelines. In the immediate aftermath of the 1937 Marco Polo
Bridge Incident, Japan’s Home Ministry prohibited any views that could be construed as being
against the war or unfavorable to the military.34) As a member of the Army Information Corps,
Hino was given an additional list of rules that included never describing a military loss, never
alluding to any Japanese acts that might be conceived as criminal, and always portraying the
enemy as worthy of contempt.35) Burdened with these requirements, Hino writes that censorship
limited the fullness of his work to an extent that the typical Japanese reader was left in a state of
unreasonable happiness.”36) In fact, authorities censored Mugi to Heitai (Barley and Soldiers) in
twenty-seven places and Hino would later claim that censorship laws meant that he could write
less than a tenth of what he would have liked to have said.37) Even so, as noted, critics in Europe
and North America were—at the time of its writing—nearly unanimous in recognizing a
pervasive humanism in Mugi to Heitai. After all, it was difﬁcult to attack the “militarism” in a
writer who penned passages such as the following:
It seemed ludicrous that pieces of steel and powder were able to stamp out precious lives
with such impunity, and I often found myself seething with rage which I found hard to
control. Years of worry, anxiety, and hope, had gone into bringing everyone of us to
manhood; parents, wives, children, whom the men never tired of talking about and even
dreamed of, longed for the day when their loved ones would return and with radiant hopes
for the future; yet all this was wiped out in a second by a bullet or shell.38)
Pearl Buck’s response to such writing was to claim that Hino’s books contained “no
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propaganda, no pompousness, no self-justiﬁcation, none of the things we have come to expect
about this war they are waging.”39) Nevertheless, a decade later, a new world situation required a
rereading of his work. Hino Ashihei was no longer the Erich Remarque of the East; he was now
an obstacle to Japanese democratization. How did he respond? Scholars of Hino agree that even
while he continued to empathize with common soldiers, he never confessed any sense of guilt for
his role in shaping their public image.40) Perhaps the closest he came was in his 1950 autobio-
graphical novella, “Tsuih -osha” (The Purgee), with a train conversation between a former
Japanese soldier and Hino’s old friend Onogi:
“How far are you going?” the soldier asked.
He was an older man, at least forty, part of the now demobilized army. His livid skin was
covered with a pattern of malnutrition spots, and he was missing an unnatural number of
teeth. Tenderly, he puffed on a cigarette.
“To [Kyushu],” Onogi replied. …
“Kyushu, that’s where Hino Ashihei is, isn’t it?” 
The soldier spoke as if recalling something. Onogi absorbed the words, all the while
sensing a peculiar look in the soldier’s eyes. Truth be told, Onogi was on his way to see
Hino. Knowing a variety of opinions that soldiers held of his friend Hino, Onogi recognized
the look as unfavorable. And so, to avoid being included in the coming attack he evasively
responded, “I believe you’re right.”
“Is he safe?”
“What do you mean ‘safe’?”
“He wasn’t arrested as a war criminal?”
“No.”
“Hmmm. Is that so.”
I saw a deep glare of resentment in the soldier’s hollow eyes. 
He continued, “I hold a grudge against Hino. We read his books and believing that we
could win this war went off and fought as hard as we could. And this is how it ends …”
Onogi could not respond. As he reﬂected on the extent to which the enormous drive of war
conditions the smallness of individual responsibility, … the soldier mumbled, “It would
have been great if that man had slit open his own belly.”41)
Hino did contemplate suicide. He later wrote, “I held a dagger to my body on the night of
[August] seventeenth [1945], but my will not yet determined and so, with thoughts of lingering
attachments, I put the blade down. Tears ﬂowed unrestrained. Although I no longer cared for
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this body that had many times lost its chance to die, I longed to see to the end of this day of
imperial humiliation.”42) It was, in short, Japan’s defeat for which Hino felt responsible.43) But did
defeat justify his purge? Fellow soldier writer Ozaki Shir -o accepted such logic in his own purge,
arguing that while his wartime writings were in keeping with his duty as a loyal subject, he
understood that it was this same duty that now required him to sacriﬁce himself for the
nation.44) Hino felt otherwise. “The era makes the hero,” he would write in “Tsuih-osha” (The
Purgee), “and then it changes. … No matter how great a person’s character, one can never
survive the storms of the age.”
Unlike Hino, there were those caught in the Public Information Media purge who successfully
appealed their status. Ishikawa Tatsuz -o is a prime example. As with Hino, Ishikawa won the
Akutagawa Prize, propelling him to literary prominence. Also like Hino, his most signiﬁcant
work was based on the lives of ordinary soldiers. In 1937, just two years following the
Akutagawa Prize, the monthly journal Ch-u-o K-oron commissioned Ishikawa to write a novel on
the war in China. He accepted the offer and reached Nanjing only weeks after the city
surrendered, arriving in time to witness the ensuing madness. Returning to Japan, he quickly
wrote a novella entitled Ikiteiru Heitai (Living Soldiers) for the March 1938 issue of Ch-u-o K-oron.45)
The story focuses on a single infantry unit involved in the battle for Nanjing. Wanting to show
the soldiers as they were—not as the benevolent liberators that ofﬁcial sources presented them
as being—led him to graphically describe their willingness to rape and kill Chinese civilians.
The editors of Ch-u-o K-oron, attempting to avoid government censorship, extensively edited the
manuscript prior to publication. Nevertheless, on the eve of its publication, the authorities
issued a prohibition on the work. Ishikawa was then tried and sentenced to four months
imprisonment for “depicting the slaughter and pillage of noncombatants by … the Imperial
Armed Forces, and for writing things that disturb peace and order.”46) Yet, for all its gut-
wrenching depictions, Ikiteiru Heitai does not criticize Japan’s presence in China. Ishikawa, like
Hino, believed in the spirit of Pan-Asianism; while he recognized Japanese cruelty, he saw these
acts as an inevitable consequence of an unavoidable war.47) As with Hino, Ishikawa received a
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42) Hino Ashihei, Sanky-o Dokugo, quoted in: Kido Hiroshi, Kappa Y-ush-u: Hino Ashihei to Sh-owashi no
Jiku, Tsurushima Masao Kikigaki (Fukuoka: Nishi Nihon Shinbunsha, 1995), 188.
43) Ikeda, 11.
44) Shimane, “Tsuih-o Sareta Hitobito no Iibun,” 37.
45) Zeljko Cipris, “Radiant Carnage: Japanese Writers on the War Against China” (Ph.d. diss., Columbia
University, 1994), 153–154. Cipris’ dissertation includes a complete translation of Ikiteiru Heitai.
Haruko Taya Cook, “The Many Lives of Living Soldiers: Ishikawa Tatsuz-o and Japan’s War in Asia,”
in War, Occupation and Creativity: Japan and East Asia, 1920–1960, eds. Marlene Mayo and J.
Thomas Rimer (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001) 149–150.
46) Cook, “The Many Lives of Living Soldiers,” 156, 162.  The prison sentence was suspended.
47) Following the war, American prosecutors tried to use Ishikawa’s work as evidence of the Nanjing
massacre. Ishikawa refused to cooperate on the basis that Chinese ﬁghting tactics made the incident
inevitable. Ibid., 165–166.
provisional purge designation following the war. But unlike his fellow writer, Ishikawa escaped
ofﬁcial purge status with a successful appeal. His exoneration resulted from the military’s
suppression of Ikiteiru Heitai and the absence of absolute militarism in his second wartime
work, Bukan Sakusen (The Wuhan Operation).48)
The Occupation had more to lose in purging Ishikawa than it had to gain. Ishikawa’s postwar
novels supported a non-romanticized view of Japan’s war experience and Ikiteiru Heitai, ﬁnally
published in early 1946, saw substantial success as a non-propagative portrayal of the war.49) It
thus made sense to remove Ishikawa’s purge designation, even if he had in some way supported
the war effort. Clearly, the degree of one’s support of Japanese aggression and the extent of one’s
inﬂuence on the general public became part of an unwritten code for purge designation. Had any
of Hino’s works been fully censored, had he been less inﬂuential during the war, or had he been
a vocal supporter of the Occupation after Japan’s defeat, it is likely that he too would have
avoided ofﬁcial purge designation.
Of provisionally purged writers, only fourteen percent successfully appealed their status,
escaping ofﬁcial purge designation.50) The others, removed from public life, understood that they
were paying the price for having supported the war effort. Technically, the purge was
impersonal and non-punitive. But for those targeted, the punitive nature of the purge was never
in question. In fact, most Japanese failed to distinguish purgees from war criminals. The only
difference between the two, according to public opinion studies, was the degree of
punishment.51) Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967), Japan’s Prime Minster and leading political ﬁgure
for most of the Occupation, recognized the apparent contradiction between principle and
practice. In his memoirs he writes that while SCAP wished the Japanese to “embrace liberalism
and democracy, … the ‘purges’ were also the expression of a desire on the part of the Allied
Powers to retaliate on the leaders of the nation they had defeated.”52) Opposing what he believed
to be “arbitrary standards based upon a misreading of history,” Yoshida repeatedly confronted
SCAP on the issue of purge policy; MacArthur’s penned responses were formulaic in its defense.
A December 1946 letter reads, it “is not punitive; no one is adjudged guilty of any offense, nor is
it intended that anyone be punished thereunder.”53) Nearly four year later, in June 1950,
MacArthur similarly wrote, “The guiding philosophy of [the purge] has been protective, not
punitive.”54) MacArthur and top SCAP ofﬁcers wanted to limit purge discourse to democratization.
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48) Asahi Shinbun, 15 May 1948.
49) Cook, “The Many Lives of Living Soldiers,” 164.
50) “Summary of Purge Statistics By Categories,” PRJ vol. 2, 564.
51) Montgomery, 17.
52) Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Boston:
The Riverside Press, 1962), 147.
53) Douglas MacArthur, “Letter to Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan, December 26, 1946,” PRJ vol.
2, 500.
54) Douglas MacArthur, “Press Release: The Following Letter from General MacArthur to Prime Minister
Yoshida is Hereby Released to the Press, June 6, 1950,” History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the
At no point was the implied guilt of the provisional designation system ofﬁcially acknowledged.
That said, the purge did have its non-Japanese critics. At the height of the Public Information
Media Purge, Walter Butterworth, Director of the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs, questioned
SCAP’s democratization philosophy, challenging in particular the assumption that all Japanese
who had adapted themselves to wartime Japan and participated in her expansion were
inherently against democratization. He also saw the non-judicial removal of undesirable persons
as being anti-democratic, writing: “Penalization of the large numbers of purgees whose only
crime was to serve their country in time of war would not seem to be the best illustration we
might be providing the Japanese of the beneﬁts of impartial justice and respect for personal
rights.”55) SCAP’s purge of wartime writers—a policy based on the belief that they were an
obstacle to postwar democratization—clearly required a leap in logic. Nevertheless, it was this
mindset that created the Public Information Media purge, and it was this same thinking that
brought it to an end. Democratization’s success meant that the purge was no longer needed.
Hino Ashihei’s purge lasted thirty months. On October 13, 1950, SCAP freed Hino and 10,089
other Japanese from their dispossessed status. Their release followed the conclusion of an
appeal board that the purges had been in “error.”56) The same committee that rejected Hino’s
original appeal on the grounds that he had propagated militarism now ruled that even though
Hino had a wide inﬂuence on the public, “he abided by his principle of humanism and tried to
repel the prevailing trend of the times from his soldier’s standpoint.”57) The evidence for and
against Hino remained unchanged. The soldier books that now exonerated him were the same
works that the world had praised prior to the Paciﬁc War and then condemned following
Japan’s defeat. But with Japanese militarism fading into the past and democratization ﬁrmly
embedded, the measuring scale of wartime accountability realigned itself to meet the needs of
the present. The scale now ruled in favor of Hino’s humanistic qualities.
The purge embodied a moral collision between intent and result. It was designed to be
collective (impersonal), preventative (demilitarization), and progressive (democratization); what
it became was individualized and punitive. As a punitive measure, the purge raises questions of
accountability, both real and imagined. To declare Hino Ashihei and other soldier writers
victims of circumstance would be to undermine the creativeness that earned them their wartime
prominence. Yet, to go to the other extreme and target soldier writers—for this is how their
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Occupation of Japan, microﬁlm (1952).
55) W. Walton Butterworth Jr, “Memorandum by the Director of the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs
(Butterworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State,” 27 October 1948, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1948 vol. 6, Far East and Australia (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce), 649.
56) Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume IV, East Asia and The Paciﬁc (Washington:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1976), 1337. Although SCAP de-purged 10,090 Japanese, nearly 200,000
remained under purge status. Ibid.
57) “Report on Examination Appeal,” (28 June 1949) ﬁle: Appeals Board Decision on Prominent Cases. RG
331, U.S. National Archives.  Although the appeal board made their decision in June of 1949, Hino was
not notiﬁed of his de-purge until October 1950.
purge was ultimately interpreted—is to encourage a form of historical myopia in which the
complexity of Japan’s wartime culture is reduced to categories of hero, villain, and victim. Hino
was none of these. He was, after all, no more than a soldier writer whose work was reevaluated
from the vantage point of a ﬁckle and ﬂeeting present. His books that had been the writings of a
humanist became an anachronism that was incongruous to a defeated nation and inconvenient
to an occupying foreign power. SCAP designed the purge for the beneﬁt of a democratic future
and administered the purge based on the sins of a militaristic past. These criteria were
nevertheless trapped to the present and the belief that the construction of a new Japan required
the destruction of the old. Like the war that spurred his reputation, Hino Ashihei’s status
required that he be relegated to the past. When the new postwar history was secure and the
purge of Hino was no longer a pragmatic necessity, Occupation authorities reversed their
decision, admitted their “errors,” and freed him of his purge status. Hino Ashihei, voice of the
Japanese soldier, no longer threatened a rewriting of the nation.
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